A note on passepartout problems by Estevez Fernandez, M.A. et al.
TI 2010-031/1 
Tinbergen Institute Discussion Paper 
 
A Note on Passepartout Problems  
 Arantza Estévez-Fernándeza 
Peter Bormb 
Herbert Hamersb 
 
a Department of Econometrics and Operations Research, VU University Amsterdam, and Tinbergen 
Institute; 
b CentER and Department of Econometrics and Operations Research, Tilburg University. 
 
 
 
 
Tinbergen Institute 
 
The Tinbergen Institute is the institute for economic 
research of the Erasmus Universiteit Rotterdam, 
Universiteit van Amsterdam, and Vrije Universiteit 
Amsterdam. 
 
Tinbergen Institute Amsterdam 
Roetersstraat 31 
1018 WB Amsterdam 
The Netherlands 
Tel.:  +31(0)20 551 3500 
Fax: +31(0)20 551 3555 
 
Tinbergen Institute Rotterdam 
Burg. Oudlaan 50 
3062 PA  Rotterdam 
The Netherlands 
Tel.: +31(0)10 408 8900 
Fax: +31(0)10 408 9031 
 
 
 
Most TI discussion papers can be downloaded at 
http://www.tinbergen.nl. 
A note on passepartout problems∗
Arantza Este´vez-Ferna´ndeza,† Peter Bormb Herbert Hamersb
aDepartment of Econometrics and Operations Research and Tinbergen Institute, VU
University Amsterdam.
bCentER and Department of Econometrics and Operations Research, Tilburg University.
Abstract:
This note provides a methodological contribution to the allocation of joint revenues obtained from
passepartouts. In a passepartout system a group of service providers oﬀers a passepartout that allows
its owners the use of speciﬁed services for an unlimited number of times during a ﬁxed period of time. The
corresponding allocation problem is then how to share the total joint revenues of the passepartout system
adequately among the service providers. Arguments are provided to model a passepartout problem
within the framework of bankruptcy and context-speciﬁc properties are considered in order to select an
appropriate allocation rule.
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1 Introduction
In a passepartout system a group of service providers decides to emit a passepartout to cos-
tumers that allows an unlimited use of speciﬁc services during a limited period of time at a
ﬁxed price. Passepartout systems are quite common. For example, in The Netherlands, the
OV-jaarkaart allows unlimited use of public transport (train, bus, metro and tram) during one
year and the Museumkaart allows unlimited visit to more than 400 museums during one year.
In Copenhagen, the Card Plus allows its owners both to visit a large number of museums (and
amusement parks) and to use public transport during a limited amount of time. Note that
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these cases typically do not lead to surplus-sharing problems since they are concerned with
semi-public facilities and are heavily subsidized for aims of promotion or social well-being. In
particular, without a steep rise of the total number of customers, the amount of money that
is obtained by means of the passepartout system will be less than the total amount of money
that service providers would have obtained without this system.
As an example of a passepartout system concerning private facilities, consider the “3 Parken
Pas” that allows to its owners an unlimited number of visits during one year to three amuse-
ment parks in The Netherlands: Walibi World, Dolﬁnarium, and Avonturenpark Hellendoorn.
In case of private facilities, the passepartout system may not cover all the services provided by
the members of the system, but only some speciﬁc ones. In this case, the additional revenues
obtained by the regular services that are not covered by the passepartout will be enough to
compensate the “losses” generated by the passepartout. In particular, the 3 Parken Pas only
covers the entrance to the parks and extra services as parking fees, the rental of lockets, and
the purchase of food, drinks, and souvenirs have to be paid separately. Although we could not
get the exact data on the 3 Parken Pas due to privacy rules, we were informed that basically
each amusement park keeps the full price of all passepartouts sold at their own gates. Thus no
explicit reallocation of the revenues takes place. They very well realize that this is not a “fair”
way to share the joint revenues generated by the 3 Parken Pas. However, the extra proﬁt and
exposure revenues due to additional consumption and marketing considerations prove to be
enough incentive to maintain the cooperation.
A passepartout problem consists of how to share the joint revenues obtained by the sales
of passepartouts. Generally speaking, the total revenue obtained from a passepartout system
will be less than the total revenue that the service providers would have obtained if they had
charged regular prices for the services provided to passepartout holders. On the basis of this
feature, we propose a bankruptcy model (for a survey on this topic we refer to Thomson (2003))
to solve passepartout problems. In the corresponding bankruptcy problem the estate will rep-
resent the total revenues obtained from the sales of the passepartouts and the vector of claims
will represent the total amounts that each service provider would have obtained if its customers
with passepartout had paid regular prices instead. Note that whereas the estate is the result
of cooperation in the system, the claims are in principle non-cooperative: the providers take as
reference point the amount of money that they individually would have obtained in the new
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setting on the basis of their individual regular prices.
Various bankruptcy rules have been proposed and characterized in the literature. In order
to select an adequate rule for the passepartout problem, we consider context-speciﬁc properties
that a rule should satisfy. Since the vector of claims reﬂects the opportunity cost in terms of
number of users and regular price per users, we argue that claim truncation is an undesirable
property for a passepartout rule. As a result, well-known rules as the constrained equal awards
rule, the Talmud rule, and the adjusted proportional rule are not good candidates to become
passepartout rules. We further argue that every service provider should be initially entitled
to that part of the estate that the others do not claim: the property of minimal rights ﬁrst.
Other properties that we propose are respect of positive claims, equal treatment of equals,
claim monotonicity, order preservation, and two more technical ones: self-duality for problems
with zero minimal rights and composition down for problems with zero minimal rights. The
proportional rule is a well-known and highly accepted rule which does not satisfy claim trunca-
tion, but unfortunately does not satisfy minimal rights ﬁrst, although it does satisfy the above
list of further properties. The violation of minimal rights ﬁrst can be circumvented by assign-
ing ﬁrst the minimal rights to the service providers and then allocating the remaining estate
proportional to the adjusted claims. We will call this rule the proportional rule with minimal
rights ﬁrst (called conceded proportional rule in Moreno-Ternero (2006)), and promote this rule
as an excellent candidate for a passepartout rule.
Passepartout problems were ﬁrst studied in Ginsburgh and Zang (2001, 2003) for the spe-
ciﬁc case of museum passes. These two papers model passepartout problems as cooperative
games where the value of a coalition is the total amount of revenues from the passepartouts of
those costumers that only use their passepartouts to make use of the service providers in the
coalition. Subsequently, the Shapley value of this game is proposed as a solution to the alloca-
tion problem at hand. Obviously, one of the drawbacks of this type of model is the high degree
of information needed to derive this game: a historical record of the exact use of each single
passepartout is needed. Moreover, this approach lacks a context speciﬁc motivation for selecting
a general solution as the Shapley value. The novelty of our current approach is twofold. First,
the modeling of passepartout problems within the framework of bankruptcy problems. This
is done with a relatively low need regarding informational data on costumers behavior (only
the number of times that a service provider is used by passepartout holders), while explicitly
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taking into account diﬀerences in both regular prices and asymmetries in the users’ attitudes.
Secondly, the normative context-speciﬁc analysis of passepartout problems in order to provide
an adequate rule for passepartout problems.
2 A bankruptcy approach to passepartout problems
A passepartout problem is denoted by (N, π, p, μ,m) where N is the (ﬁnite) set of service
providers that are involved in the passepartout system, π is the price of the passepartout,
p = (pi)i∈N ∈ R
N is the vector of regular prices of the various services, and (μ,m) is a realization
of the passepartout system, with μ the number of passepartouts sold and m = (mi)i∈N ∈ R
N
indicating for each service provider i ∈ N the number of times1,2 that its services were em-
ployed by passepartout owners. Since it is reasonable to assume that μπ ≤
∑
i∈N mipi (i.e.
customers want to “proﬁt” from their passepartouts), one can deﬁne an associated bankruptcy
problem (N,E, c) as follows. The estate E equals the total revenues that are obtained from
the sale of the passepartouts3, i.e. E = μπ, and the vector of claims c ∈ RN represents the
opportunity costs for each provider i ∈ N , i.e. the amount ci = mipi that the provider would
have obtained if its services had been charged on the basis of its regular price.
There exist various types of allocation rules for bankruptcy problems in the literature (cf.
Thomson (2003)). Formally, a bankruptcy rule R assigns to each bankruptcy problem (N,E, c)
a vector of payoﬀs R(N,E, c) ∈ RN . Following Thomson (2003), such a rule is always supposed
to satisfyeﬃciency, (
∑
i∈N Ri(N,E, c) = E), non-negativity (Ri(N,E, c) ≥ 0 for every i ∈ N),
and claim boundedness (Ri(N,E, c) ≤ ci for every i ∈ N). In order to decide which rule is more
adequate for passepartout problems, we analyze passepartout problems in a normative way.
A provider’s claim indicates its opportunity cost in terms of the number of users and the
regular price per user. The claims of the service providers give an indication of how important
they are to the system: the higher a claim of a given service provider, the higher the number
1If a particular customer with a passepartout card uses the same service twice, this counts as two services.
2Note that (contrary to the model of Ginsburgh and Zang (2003)) we do not need the exact behavior of each
passepartout holder, but only the number of times that a service provider is employed by passepartout holders.
3Of course, if there are costs to providing the passepartout facility, this can be taken into account as well, for
instance in the deﬁnition of the estate E, which is simply the “bag of money” that is left to be divided among
the service providers.
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of costumers that use its services, indicating that the service provider is attracting customers
to the passepartout system. Ignoring any part of this claim is not economically motivated and
may punish, in particular those providers that attract clients to buy a passepartout. Due to
this, we argue, contrary to standard considerations, that a bankruptcy rule suitable for the
passepartout problem should not satisfy claim truncation. A bankruptcy rule R satisﬁes claim
truncation if the amount that the rule assigns to each provider does not change if the claims
are previously truncated by ignoring the part of a claim that exceeds the total estate. Formally,
R satisﬁes claim truncation if for every bankruptcy problem (N,E, c)
R(N,E, c) = R(N,E, c′)
with c′i = min{ci, E} for every i ∈ N . Note that since claim truncation seems an undesirable
property in the passepartout setting, no game theoretic rule (see Thomson (2003) and Curiel
et al. (1987)) is a good candidate to become an adequate rule for passepartout problems.
Therefore, well studied bankruptcy rules as the constrained equal awards rule, the Talmud
rule, and the adjusted proportional rule are not good candidates to become passepartout rules.
We further argue that a passepartout rule should satisfy minimal rights ﬁrst. The minimal
right, ri(N,E, c), of provider i ∈ N is the amount that remains if all other providers’ claims
have been fully satisﬁed (or 0 if the estate is not high enough to satisfy these claims), i.e. for
every bankruptcy problem (N,E, c)
ri(N,E, c) = max{0, E −
∑
j∈N\{i}
cj}
for every i ∈ N . Roughly speaking, the minimal right of provider i is the part of the estate that
i is entitled to since nobody else claims it. A bankruptcy rule R satisﬁes minimal rights ﬁrst
if applying the rule directly or ﬁrst paying each provider its minimal right and then applying
the rule to the remaining problem given by the updated estate and updated claims, gives the
same result. Formally, R satisﬁes minimal rights ﬁrst if for every bankruptcy problem (N,E, c)
R(N,E, c) = r(N,E, c) +R(N,E −
∑
i∈N
ri(N,E, c), c− r(N,E, c)).
Since a passepartout system is based on cooperation among service providers, every ser-
vice provider that is required to indeed carry out a service for passepartout holders should
receive a positive share of the revenues generated by the passepartout. Therefore, we argue
that a passepartout rule should satisfy respect of positive claims. Formally, a bankruptcy rule
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R satisﬁes respect of positive claims if for every bankruptcy problem (N,E, c)
Ri(N,E, c) > 0
for every i ∈ N with ci > 0.
Another important principle of fairness is non-discrimination between service providers,
i.e. two service providers with the same claim should get the same amount from the revenues
generated by the passepartout system. Therefore, we argue that a passepartout rule should
satisfy equal treatment of equals. Formally, a bankruptcy rule R satisﬁes equal treatment of
equals if for every bankruptcy problem (N,E, c)
Ri(N,E, c) = Rj(N,E, c)
for every i, j ∈ N with ci = cj .
A further natural requirement on a passepartout rule is that no service provider should
suﬀer from an increase of passepartout holders using its services. Therefore we argue that a
passepartout rule should satisfy claim monotonicity. Formally, a bankruptcy rule R satisﬁes
claim monotonicity if for every bankruptcy problem (N,E, c)
Ri(N,E, (c˜i, (cj)j∈N\{i})) ≥ Ri(N,E, c)
for every i ∈ N and every c˜i ≥ ci.
Furthermore, the fact that the claim of a service provider indicates the importance of the
service provider to the system requires that a service provider should never get less than another
one with a lower claim. On the other hand, in order to protect service providers with a low
claim, a service provider with a high claim should lose at least as much as another one with
a lower claim. Therefore, we argue that a passepartout rule should satisfy order preservation.
Formally, a bankruptcy rule R satisﬁes order preservation if for every bankruptcy problem
(N,E, c)
Ri(N,E, c) ≥ Rj(N,E, c) and ci −Ri(N,E, c) ≥ cj −Rj(N,E, c)
for every i, j ∈ N with ci ≥ cj .
The following two properties are of a more technical nature and are concerned with com-
putability issues. A bankruptcy rule R satisﬁes self-duality for problems with zero minimal
rights if given a bankruptcy problem with zero minimal rights, applying the rule directly or
indirectly via ﬁrst giving the full claims to the providers and then subtracting the surplus ac-
cording to the rule does not make a diﬀerence. Formally, a bankruptcy rule R satisﬁes order
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preservation if for every bankruptcy problem (N,E, c) with r(N,E, c) = 0
R(N,E, c) = c−R(N,
∑
i∈N
ci − E, c).
A bankruptcy rule R satisﬁes composition down for problems with zero minimal rights if
given a bankruptcy problem with zero minimal rights, if the estate is lower than initially
recorded, then every claimant gets the same in the new situation as if the rule is applied to
the new estate using as claims what the claimants had been initially allocated. Formally, if for
every bankruptcy problem (N,E, c) with r(N,E, c) = 0 and every E′ < E
R(N,E′, c) = R(N,E′, R(N,E, c)).
The proportional rule is a well-known and widely accepted rule for bankruptcy problems.
For a bankruptcy problem (N,E, c), the proportional rule assigns
PROP(N,E, c) = λc
with λ = E∑
j∈N cj
.
It is well-known that the proportional rule is the only rule satisfying both self-duality
and composition down (see Thomson (2003)). Unfortunately, the proportional rule does not
satisfy minimal rights ﬁrst. A way to circumvent the violation of minimal rights ﬁrst is by
ﬁrst allocating the minimal rights and then sharing the remaining estate proportionally to the
adjusted claims in a second stage. This new rule is called the proportional rule with minimal
rights4. Formally, for a bankruptcy problem (N,E, c), the proportional rule with minimal rights
assigns
MRPROP(N,E, c) = r(N,E, c) + PROP
(
N,E −
∑
i∈N
ri(N,E, c), c− r(N,E, c)
)
.
Next, we provide two examples that illustrate the computation of the proportional rule with
minimal rights and that points out how the proportional rule with minimal rights takes into
account possible asymmetries among the service providers.
Example 2.1. Suppose that we have two service providers, 1 and 2, with a passepartout sys-
tem. The regular prices of the services for provider 1 and 2 are 10 and 5 Euro, respectively. The
4This rule is called the conceded proportional rule in Moreno-Ternero (2006).
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price of the passepartout is 12 Euro. Assume that each person who buys a passepartout uses
each service once and that the total number of passepartouts sold equals 100. For the associated
bankruptcy problem (N,E, c) we ﬁnd that E = 1200 and c = (1000, 500). In this case, the vector
of minimal rights is r(N,E, c) = (700, 200) and the allocation proposed by the proportional rule
with minimal rights is given by MRPROP(N,E, c) = (700, 200) + PROP(N, 300, (300, 300)) =
(850, 350). This outcome clearly takes into account the asymmetry in regular prices between
the two services. 
Example 2.2. Suppose again that we have two service providers, 1 and 2, with a passep-
artout system. The regular price of the services for both providers is 10 Euro while the
price of the passepartout is 15 Euro. Assume that each person who buys a passepartout
uses service 1 once and service 2 twice and that the total number of passepartouts sold
equals 100. For the associated bankruptcy problem (N,E, c) it holds that E = 1500 and
c = (1000, 2000). In consequence, the vector of minimal rights is r(N,E, c) = (0, 500) and the al-
location proposed by the proportional rule with minimal rights is given by MRPROP(N,E, c) =
(0, 500)+PROP(N, 1000, (1000, 1500)) = (400, 1100). This outcome reﬂects the fact that there
is a clear diﬀerence in the utilization attitude of passepartout holders although the providers
are symmetric on the basis of regular prices. 
The following theorem is a direct consequence of the characterization of the proportional
rule by means of self-duality and composition down (see Thomson (2003)).
Theorem 2.3. The proportional rule with minimal rights is the unique rule satisfying mini-
mal rights ﬁrst, self-duality for problems with zero minimal rights, and composition down for
problems with zero minimal rights.
Moreover, it is readily veriﬁed that
Proposition 2.4. The proportional rule with minimal rights satisﬁes respect of positive claims,
equal treatment of equals, claim monotonicity and order preservation. Besides, it does not
satisfy claim truncation.
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3 Passepartout games a´ la Ginsburgh and Zang
A game theoretical approach to passepartout problems was proposed by Ginsburgh and Zang
(2003) for the special case in which the service providers are museums. Given a passepartout
problem (N, π, p, μ,m), they denote by M the set of customers that buy a passepartout card
(note that |M | = m) and for every j ∈ M , they denote by Kj ⊂ N the set of service providers
that customer j uses (at least once). Then, a corresponding passepartout game (N, v) is deﬁned
by
v(S) = π · |{j ∈ M |Kj ⊂ S}|
for every S ⊂ N . The Shapley value of this game is proposed as a way to share the joint revenues
mπ from the passepartout system. Ginsburgh and Zang (2001) admit that their approach may
not be suitable when the regular prices of the service providers are diﬀerent. Quoting Ginsburgh
and Zang (2001), p 372:
“[S]ince the nature of the service provided and its pricing are diﬀerent, it seems
reasonable . . . to use a variant of the scheme oﬀered below where the allocations are
weighted by the individual admission prices”
As argued in the introduction, there are two other drawbacks: the lack of a methodological
study of the passepartout problem to select the Shapley value of the corresponding game as a
passepartout rule, and the high degree of informational data needed to obtain the coalitional
values of the game.
We now reconsider our two earlier examples to illustrate serious drawbacks of Ginsburgh
and Zang’s proposal, not only concerning diﬀerence in prices but also concerning asymmetries
in actual users’ attitude.
Example 3.1. Reconsider the problem introduced in Example 2.1. Using Ginsburgh and Zang’s
solution, each provider would obtain 600 Euro. In this proposal service provider 2 obtains more
than it would have obtained if all passepartout services had been paid according to its regular
price (500 Euro). 
Example 3.2. Reconsider the problem introduced in Example 2.2. Using Ginsburgh and Zang’s
solution, each service provider would obtain 750 Euro from this museum pass system. There-
fore, in this case both service providers obtain the same amount, although service providers 1
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and 2 would have earned 1000 and 2000 Euro respectively if all services had been carried out
on the basis of regular prices. 
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